The Dictator Vs. The General.
However, to hit General Tamba this hard who, only three years ago, took all risks and put his life on the line to forestall the coup against his government allegedly led by Tamba's predecessor, Colonel Ndure Cham, means something extremely serious must have provoked President Jammeh's harsh action.
I think after that incident in 2006, what Tamba proved was his absolute loyalty to Jammeh and members of his government. But Jammeh was a soldier and had lived the experience of what it could take for soldiers to resort to mutiny most important among them being meddling with their monetary entitlement, underfeeding them and abusing their residential facilities. The president was there as a Military Police Commander when in 1990 and 1991 the GNA soldiers resorted to mutinous actions in what was reported to have been the delayed payment of their ECOMOG allowances. But for those of us who were in the barracks during both incidents, low morale among the troops attributable to abusive living conditions at Yundum Barracks in particular, was factorial in the decisive causes. Then in 1994, still as a member of the GNA MP, Jammeh witnessed how the soldiers were gradually irritated by the abusive conditions they were subjected to by their superiors culminating in the July 22, 1994 eruption that turned into a successful overthrow of the PPP government. No doubt, Jammeh is more sensitive to the signs and symptoms of instability within the armed forces than former President Jawara. Jawara in fact, paid little attention to his security outside of what he thought was adequately provided for by his presidential guard confined to the State House perimeter. And with the assuring presence of first, the Senegalese after the 1981 abortive coup and the subsequent contracts signed with British and Nigerian military experts to take command and control of The Gambia Armed forces, the last thing that occurred in his mind was to think of army barracks security threat much more visiting them to appraise the trouble-causing conditions the soldiers were condemned to live with. So, whereas it seems like Jammeh surprisingly visited Yundum camp and bumped into the problem that resulted in his immediate dismissal of CDS Tamba an Co., he may have very well been forewarned by inside watchdogs about the deteriorating conditions, posing potential agitation for mutiny which only by taking this drastic measure was he able to avert an eminent crisis that might have ended in the downfall of his government or the possible loss of some lives.
On the flip side, the risk in the purge of these men proven to be very loyal to him without the understandable reasons, either by demonstrating or explaining the evidence for public satisfaction could one day in the future, undercut the courage of others determined to put their lives on the line to save his government like Tamba did three years ago. Anyway, Gambians at home are now speaking about horrible living conditions of soldiers in the barracks being shown on TV that left the public less sympathetic to the officers affected. Jammeh, they said has been conducting the tour transparently leaving no doubt in people’s minds that his actions were justifiable.
What I would have suggested under such circumstances, given the loyalty they had shown since the coup would be to redeploy them somewhere outside the military if it is not going to hurt the situation anymore than firing them would. But what do I know? After all, President Jammeh after fifteen years in power has taken radical actions, within and outside the armed forces that I had wrongly judged as mistakes peripheral to his Achilles’ heel; yet in all cases, he always had bounced back in a way that leaves me questioning my qualifications to doubt his trend of reasoning. As a result, I now prefer not to rush to any conclusions when Jammeh’s actions do not appear logical to me.
In any case, looking at the never ending burden he carries as a president, constantly encountering, among other problems, the dilemma of losing allies proven to be genuinely loyal to him, one wonders how much longer he could continue counting on more loyalists to support his course. It must always be a bitter pill to swallow whenever he has to resort to these extreme measures of turning against his loyalists and certainly become a double dose of the medicine when he later realizes that he needs them back after they might have been mistakenly or erroneously punished or humiliated. But since Jammeh is the second president The Gambia ever had since independence in 1965, he could very well be crafting his strategies from lessons traceable in his predecessor’s bumpy experiences especially, in matters pertaining to national security. For instance, since the establishment of the GNA in 1984, President Jammeh being among the first to enlist during the early days was definitely cognizant of President Jawara’s habit of sparing loyalists from any form of punishment even where their actions seemed to have violated national security policies. Instead of firing and certainly never detaining those loyalists whose actions were considered destructive to the security doctrine of the country, President Jawara would redeploy them to positions sometimes more attractive than those they had held before. But then, with all the precautions Jawara had put in place –employing the best foreign experts to help maintain stability in the armed forces- it took only ten years 1984 to 1994 for the soldiers he created for his protection to rebel against him and overthrew his government.
By the same token, Jammeh was there to monitor the troubling development of that ill-fated advice by the British Army Training Team (BATT) commander in 1990 and 1991 when the first signs of soldiers’ malcontent started to show in the barracks forbidding the government from intervening lest they succumb to the blackmail of mere mutineers. He was also aware of how government indifference to the soldier’s problems under the Nigerians from 1992 to 1994 contributed to the uprising on July 22, 1994.
But on a positive note, President Jawara after thirty years in power, still lived to survive a post-coup-de-tat lifestyle that few if any leaders experiencing the dangerous effects coups in Africa ever had. Today, Sir Dawda has compromised with Jammeh who had toppled him into exile for years before he could return home and now peacefully lives in The Gambia like a retired statesman, thanks to what many will agree to be his empathic nature towards friends and foes alike. President Jammeh must also be credited for showing a rare trait of sympathy and understanding among coup leaders that encouraged Jawara to trust his successor and returned home for the compromise.
I am therefore tempted to question whether, if he cares at all, President Jammeh will one day, after relinquishing power in whatever form or style, enjoy the same rights and privileges he has accorded Jawara. As the saying goes, I think one good turn deserves another; so I believe he could with the right investment on the right course start working on it. One never knows.
As for General Tamba and all those who were affected in the recent purge, I would have in the past advised them to try and find their way out of The Gambia like some of us did, but with the insurmountable difficulties now involved in resettling abroad either as a refugee or asylum seeker, that should be a last option. The best option I could think of at the moment which might not be endorsed by many preferring the old hopeless confrontational approach is to give the president a little bit more time until his anger subsides and then see how he could be approached to ask for his mercy. He has forgiven many in the past in more serious cases and could certainly do so in this case if approached accordingly. Anyway, I don’t think they are going to do well in the armed forces again after being humiliated and reinstated. It affects morale and confidence for effective performance. But I am sure there are many places where they can serve in the country or even in UN peacekeeping missions where most of them had served with honor.
The Generals, Kinteh and Drammeh now appointed to take over from Tamba and others are without doubt quite competent and loyal like many already ejected out of the establishment. They wouldn’t betray their superiors even if their lives depended on it; yet I fear that sooner or later, Jammeh may out of another impulsive reaction to an emergency get rid of them in a similar style. I cannot think of a way one could change President Jammeh’s style of running his government but what I can say is that he seems to be doing fine in keeping the country functional in the way he wants it. I wish I could know how to say that differently.